![]() ![]() Arjmand also attached an affidavit detailing his efforts in the dissolution action between August 2016 and December 2017 that ultimately resulted in his obtaining the pertinent rulings contained in the New Orders. The New Orders were attached as exhibits to the petition. The petition alleged that, in December 2017 and February 2018, Judge McJoynt had entered two orders in the dissolution case (New Orders) that bolstered Arjmand's previous arguments in this case about the proper scope of the 2013 Dissolution Order (and thus his arguments that the defendants' actions exceeded that scope). ¶ 8 On August 16, 2018, nearly two years after the entry of the August 2016 Order dismissing his complaint in this case, Arjmand (now represented by counsel) filed a section 2-1401 petition to "partially vacate" the August 2016 Order. It therefore dismissed Arjmand's complaint with prejudice as an improper collateral attack on the 2013 Dissolution Order. ![]() The trial court then cited legal authority for the proposition that arguments about an order entered in a dissolution case should be heard by the judge presiding over that case, and that an attempt to challenge the effects of a dissolution order in a different proceeding should be dismissed as improper. ![]() In fact, Arjmand had filed, in the dissolution case, a motion to compel those defendants to restore access to his account and that motion was scheduled for hearing in a few weeks. It noted that both Stogsdill and Morgan Stanley (which had been brought into the dissolution case as respondents to a citation to discover assets) were before Judge McJoynt, who was the proper person to address the scope of the 2013 Dissolution Order. ¶ 7 On August 17, 2016, after hearing oral arguments on the motions and stating that it had read and considered the briefs, pleadings, and exhibits submitted by the parties as well as the relevant case law they cited and "a good portion" of the pleadings in the dissolution action, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss this case (August 2016 Order). The two sets of defendants filed motions to dismiss the suit pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2014)), arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and also that it should be dismissed as an improper collateral attack on the 2013 Dissolution Order. The complaint asserted claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, tortious interference with contract, and conversion. Weichbrodt and Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg, LLP (collectively, Morgan Stanley). ¶ 6 In 2015, Arjmand (acting pro se) filed the present lawsuit against Stogsdill and the various defendants affiliated with Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, along with those entities' attorneys, the defendants Brody W. Morgan Stanley thereafter restricted Arjmand's access to his shares. Estes and The Stogsdill Law Firm (collectively, Stogsdill) wrote to Morgan Stanley, which held the shares at issue, to assert that Morgan Stanley should comply with the terms of the 2013 Dissolution Order. After the entry of that order, Muneeza's attorneys, the defendants Bryan S. ![]() ¶ 5 In 2013, the trial judge hearing the dissolution case, Judge Timothy McJoynt, entered an order (2013 Dissolution Order) restricting Arjmand's ability to cash in, transfer, encumber, or otherwise dispose of certain shares he held in Accenture, despite Arjmand's argument that the shares were nonmarital assets which he should be free to control. That dissolution action was still ongoing as of September 2018. ¶ 4 In 2009, Arjmand filed an action to dissolve his marriage to his wife, Muneeza Arjmand. Arjmand, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County that denied the petition he filed pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016)). ¶ 1 Held: Although the manner in which the trial court denied the plaintiff's petition may have violated due process, any error was harmless in light of the petition's insufficiency as a matter of law. Presiding Justice Birkett and Justice Spence concurred in the judgment. JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County. NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ![]()
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